

File

TOP SECRET

38A

AIR/O/1-2

Main HQ, First Cdn Army
13 Nov 44

G Air
Main HQ
21 Army Gp

18 Nov.

TAF informed.

REQUEST FOR AIR SP OUTSIDE 84 Gp RAF

1. 101 US Airborne Div is planning to undertake a rescue op with the object of passing through our lines certain airborne tps still in hide-out in the ARNHEM area.
2. The proposed date of this op is sometime between 14 and 18 Nov 44. H hr is to be 1900 hrs on D day.
3. At present there is a mobile SL operating at irregular intervals in the area of the rd between E600795 and E630785. This SL is used to provide artificial moonlight over the area of the op. It is felt that the success of the rescue would be seriously jeopardised if this SL were able to op during the rescue.
4. All arty able to bring fire on this area is to be fully emp in the main fire plan.
5. 84 Gp RAF have been asked to arrange for night-flying aircraft to orbit the area and engage the SL should it illuminate during the op. The firm date and time are to be notified later. 2 TAF have accepted this commitment and have indicated that night fighters would be made available for it.
6. It would be appreciated if this requirement could be given your sp.

AIR BRANCH

Brig
G1 (A)
S1 (8)
G2 (A)
S3 (A)
S3 (8)
PA

March.
2.
June.
Oct.

File 19/11/44
Date 7815/6
H.Q. 21 Army Group

W. B. Reynolds
(C C Mann) Brig Gen
Chief of Staff - Main extn 61

for GOC in C

Time of signature. 21.30. A hrs

URDRLS

WBGR:phs

H. hr 1900 - 2030 hrs

EMERGENCY OPS.

B-53(41)
G(4R)

BB-1665
5301

FOR 0320/17

21 ARMY GROUP MAIN TOP SECRET CIPHER MESSAGE D428

FROM..... SECOND ARMY MAIN

162225B

TO..... EXFOR TAC EXFOR MAIN SECOND ARMY TAC 8 CORPS
12 CORPS 30 CORPS

QVR 1 2

30
140210

DISTAN QXM
OPS(A)3

GO 164(.) TOPSEC (.) **FENEGADE** (.) **CONFIRMED TIMING OF FIRST DROP**

171300A (.) ACK

162225B

DOP EMERGENCY OPS

BA/00/16/Ops

17 Sep 44

COPY NO...26.

Copy Nos

1 - 10

British Airborne Corps

The following notes contain the arrangements for operation MARKET as understood at this HQ. Please confirm that you agree.

CODEWORDS

1. The codeword for operations of ground troops is GARDEN.
The codeword for operations of airborne troops is MARKET.

DATE

2. The operation will take place on 17 Sep.

H HOUR

3. H hour which is the time of the first drop will be 1300 hours (Zone A time comes into force 0300 hours 17 Sep).

LENGTH OF TIME OF DROPS

4. In the case of 101 Airborne Div the drop will take place from 1300 to 1340 hours and all aircraft will be back over our own lines by 1400 hours.

In the case of 1 and 82 Airborne Divs, the drops will last approximately from 1300 to 1400 hours.

POSTPONEMENT

5. The following codewords will be used to indicate that the operation is to take place or alternatively has been postponed.
 - (a) **RENEGADE** will mean the operation will take place.
 - (b) **TRIDENT** will mean that the operation has been postponed for 24 hours
6. The appropriate codewords will be passed by MOST IMMEDIATE message in clear direct by **British Airborne Corps** to Main HQ Second Army and to 30 Corps. Message will be Personal for **Big SEAGULL** followed by **codeword**.

These messages will be acknowledged by MOST IMMEDIATE signal.

Main HQ Second Army will be responsible for informing

21 Army Gp Tac
21 Army Gp Main
Second Army Tac
83 Gp RAF
12 Corps
8 Corps

/British.....

British Airborne Corps will make any communications required to Allied Airborne Army and associated Airforces. Allied Airborne Army will pass any message to Second Army through British Airborne Corps

PREARRANGED BOMBLINES

7. A. B/L up to H - 2 hours

K 6066 excl R MEUSE to E 9108 excl rly E 5522 excl rly
E 4217 excl rd E 3726 excl Rd E 1632 excl rd E 0506 excl
canal D 8609 excl rd D 8114 excl rd D 7415 excl rd D 6005.

B. B/L H - 2 hours to H + 1 hour

K 6066 excl R MEUSE K 7791 excl rd K 5898 excl rd E 4708
rd E 4108 rd E 3405 rd E 2604 rd K 1599 rd J 9790 canal
J 7398 canal D 7805 rd D 7608 rd D 6906 to D 5906.

C. B/Ls H + 1 hour onwards (until change notified)

(a) K 6066 excl R MEUSE E 7547 to E 7551 to E 8156 rd
E 8363 to E 8365 then 1000 yards NORTH of R MEUSE
to E 6967 to E 6660 excl rly E 3347 excl HERTOGENBOSCH
to E 3143 excl rly E 1532 excl rly D 9337 excl rly D 6227.

(b) (For 1 Airborne Div)

E 7573 to E 7975 to E 7979 to E 7683 rd E 7383 rd E 7386
rd E ~~6785~~ to E 5885 rd E 5876 to E 5873 then 1000 yards
SOUTH of R MEUSE to E 7573.

LANDMARK AND RECOGNITION SIGNALS

8. General

The landmark referred to in para 9 is the only definite indication to assist pilots in recognising where the bomblines is.

In addition fluorescent panels, yellow smoke, yellow celarose triangles and Mann beacon lights will be used by all troops possessing them in order to indicate their positions.

It should be made clear to all pilots that these will not mark the line of forward troops, but may be displayed as much as 5 miles behind our own lines.

9. Landmarks

12 Corps will set up at K 072879 a landmark letter T, head of letter facing NE. It will consist of white hessian cloth each arm of the T being 100 yards long; in addition each point of the T will be prolonged for 500 yards by yellow smoke from points of origin at 100 yards interval

10. Recognition signals (ground to air)

(a) Yellow smoke

Will be burnt as much as possible by our forward troops, and on gun positions, but it must be made clear in briefing that it is not possible to arrange for all the foremost

/troops to burn.....

troops to burn yellow smoke owing to proximity of enemy. The Yellow smoke must NOT therefore be taken as marking a line of foremost troops,

(b) Fluorescent panels

In the case of 12 Corps, which will not be advancing until after H + 1 hour, fluorescent panels will be displayed on the ground on a line SOUTH of MEUSE - SCHELDT JUNCTION CANAL from LOMMEL K 3095 to RANST J 7892. This line will be approximately 5 miles SOUTH of the bomblines. It should be made clear that this will not be a continuous line owing to the length of the line and the scattered dispositions of our troops.

In the case of 30 Corps fluorescent panels will be displayed on some vehicles (there not being enough panels held for all vehicles)

(c) Yellow celanese triangles

These will be displayed on gun positions.

(d) Mann Beacon lamps

These will be flashed by our troops using a series of short flashes.

FORWARD MOVEMENT OF CORPS

11. 8 and 12 Corps will not begin any forward move before H + 1 hour.

12. 30 Corps will begin to move forward on their main axis from H hour onwards, but until after H + 1 hour all 30 Corps troops will remain SOUTH of the bomblines operative from H - 2 hours to H + 1 hour. During briefing it should be made clear that fighting will certainly be going on on 30 Corps front in the area of its bridgehead over the MEUSE-SCHELDT JUNCTION CANAL, and our guns will be firing at ground targets. Guns may also be taking on ground targets on the other Corps fronts.

CODENAMES

13. Twenty copies of the codenames to be used during the operation are attached.

AA

14. No Second Army troops will undertake any AA fire by day from half an hour before sunrise on 17 Sep until further notice

Please acknowledge receipt on substitute AFA 16 attached.

WA

Schuyler
for Brigadier,
Chief of Staff,
SECOND ARMY

Copies to:

	Copy Nos
30 Corps	11 - 15
12 Corps	16 - 20
8 Corps	21 - 24
21 Army Gp Ops	25
21 Army Gp Air	26
83 Gp RAF	27
G(Air)	28 - 32

OPERATION MARKET.

TOP SECRET.

SUMMARY OF AIRCRAFT AS AT 121200B

APPX 'A' to HQ A/Tps/TS/2561/G
dated 13 Sep 44.

	PARA A/G			TUG A/G			GLIDERS			GLIDER PILOTS (CREWS)	
	38 Group	46 Group	IX TUG	38 Group	46 Group	IX TUG	HAM	HOR	OG4A	BRITISH	AMERICAN
<u>FIRST LIFT.</u>											
1. 101 (US) Airborne Div			432			70			70		70
2. 82 (US) Airborne Div			480			50			50		50
3. 1 Airborne Div	12 PFF		143	190	130		13	307		320	
4. HQ Airborne Corps				38				32	6	38	
TOTAL FIRST LIFT	12		1055	228	130	120	13	339	126	358	120
<u>SECOND LIFT.</u>											
1. 101 (US) Airborne Div						450			450		450
2. 82 (US) Airborne Div						450			450		450
3. 1 Airborne Div			126	146	110		15	237	4	256	
4. Polish Bde				10				10		10	
5. Resupply Br.	35										
TOTAL SECOND LIFT	35		126	156	110	900	15	247	904	266	900
<u>THIRD LIFT.</u>											
1. 101 (US) Airborne Div						382			382		382
2. 82 (US) Airborne Div						402			402		402
3. 878 (US) Engineer Avn Bn				10		40	10		40	10	40
4. Airfield Control Units						13		5	8	5	8
5. Polish Bde			114	35				35		35	
6. Resupply (Br)	100	66									
TOTAL THIRD LIFT	100	66	114	45		837	10	40	832	50	832

OPERATION

COPT NO. 100

HQ AIRBORNE TR XPS OF INSTRUCTION NO 1

Ref Maps

INFORMATION

1. Enemy

- (a) The enemy is under the impression that the main ALLIED effort is directed across the R MEUSE at STRASBURG. His troops from the general area of BRUSSELS and LILLE are withdrawing on the general line AACHEN - THE SAAR to behind the SEIGRIED LINE.
- (b) There are probably very few enemy troops in the general area excl ANTWERP-NIJMEGEN.
- (c) The low category coastal division which has been holding the coastal defences about the HAGUE - AMSTERDAM is believed to be withdrawing to the area NORTH and NORTH EAST of ARNHEM.
- (d) Enemy flak along the R RHINE from its mouth inland, at the bridges over the RHINE and around the towns and airfields on and NORTH of the RHINE is very considerable. It is expected, however, that the action of the ground troops of 30 Corps will have cleared the flak SOUTH of the RHINE as far EAST as TILBURG before the airborne operations commence.

2. Own Troops

- (a) 21 Army Group with First US Army under their general direction are directed on the RUHR. 12 US Army Group is directed against FRANKFURT.
- (b) The boundary between the Army Groups is inclusive 21 Army Group line BRUSSELS-DUSSELDORF. BRUNSWICK is inclusive to First US Army.
- (c) First US Army moves SOUTH of the RUHR and then turns NORTH EAST. Second British Army moves NORTH of the RUHR and then turn SOUTH EAST to make contact with First US Army. The objective of Second British Army is HANNOVER.

Second British Army's tasks are:-

- (i) to prevent the enemy breaking out to the EAST from the general area FORET DE NIEPPE - CHIENF.
- (ii) to gain a bridgehead over the R RHINE with all possible speed.

For task (i) the advance of 12 Corps is dependant on the advance of the CANADIAN Army on their left.

30 Corps, who are now responsible for the area ALOST-ANTWERP will hand over this responsibility to 12 Corps when the latter have captured CHIENF. To this purpose 30 Corps will hand over to 12 Corps their troops now garrisoned in those places, at 0600 hrs, 7 Sep.

For task (ii) the troops available are 30 Corps and British Airborne Corps.

The main bodies of 30 Corps are now in the area ANTWERP-BRUSSELS-LOUVAIN and will remain there until the morning of 7 Sep. They will adjust their advance from this area so that the surprise of the Airborne landings will not be prejudiced.

30 Corps will be divided into 3 columns as under:-

NORTH COLUMN

11 Armoured Division via NEDEL-ZAULT BOIZEL thence NORTH and EAST astride the REUDER RIJN

CENTRE COLUMN

GUARDS Armoured Division via GRAVE - NIJMEGEN - ARNHEIM.

SOUTHERN COLUMN

One Brigade Group via the MEERICH FERRY.

There will be no advance from the RHINE bridgeheads before a port between HAVRE and ANTWERP is operating.

Troops under Command British Airborne Corps for this operation are:-

1 Airborne Division
52 (L) Division (Airportable)
1 Polish Parachute Brigade
2 Airlanding Lt AA Battery
878 Airborne Aviation Engineer Battalion
AFDAG

INTENTION

3. British Airborne Corps will seize and hold the bridges at the following places:-

- (i) Over the MAAS at GRAVE
- (ii) Over the RHINE at NIJMEGEN
- (iii) Over the NEDER RIJN at ARNHEIM

so as to pass through the GUARDS Armoured Division.

COMMAND

4. On landing the British Airborne Corps will come under command 30 Corps. After the bridgehead at ARNHEIM has been secured 52 Division will come under direct command of 30 Corps while the remainder of the British Airborne Corps will come under direct command of Second British Army.

PLAN

5. The initial operations after the seizure of the three bridges will be the responsibility of 1 Airborne Division with 1 Polish Parachute Brigade under command. The latter will revert to command of Airborne Corps at the first opportunity, with the object of concentrating 1 Airborne Division in the ARNHEIM area whilst 1 Polish Parachute Brigade remains responsible for NIJMEGEN.

1 Airborne Division will arrange for three coup-de-main parties each of 8 Horsa gliders to seize the three bridges during the moon period at approximately 0430 hrs on 8 Sept. They will land as near to the bridges as possible, will prevent the destruction of these bridges and will hold them until relieved.

The aircraft and gliders available will provide, in addition to the 8 gliders for coup-de-main parties, sufficient to carry all parachutists and approximately two thirds of the air-landing troops of 1 Airborne Division in the first main lift. The timing of the first main lift will be such that it leaves bases at first light and arrives at the target area as early as possible in daylight. This is likely to be about 0800 hrs continuing until 0930 hrs.

The second main lift consists of Corps HQ, the remainder of 1 Airborne Division and 1 Polish Parachute Brigade. This lift will land either during the evening of 8 Sep or morning of 9 Sep, except that the essential part of Corps HQ will land during the evening of 8 Sep in any case.

The Chief Engineer, British Airborne Corps will move with 30 Corps and will select the airfield on which 52 Division and supplies are to be landed.

The order of priority in the selection of this airfield will be:-

- (a) VALKEN
- (b) EINDHOVEN
- (c) GELZE-RIJN.

As soon as he has selected the airfield he will inform British Airborne Corps.

878 Airborne Aviation engineer Bn will be flown in by glider to the airfield selected under orders British Airborne Corps and will prepare that airfield for use by C.47 aircraft.

As soon as the airfield is ready Corps HQ will order in the AFDAG, followed by 52 Division. 2 Airlanding Lt AA Bty will be flown in by glider to this airfield as soon as glider pilots are available.

As they arrive 52 Division will concentrate in the area of the airfield and will be responsible for its protection. 2 Airlanding Lt AA Bty will come under their command.

TIMINGS

6. The following are estimated times of arrival:-

Coup-de-Main Bridge Parties

0430 hrs 8 Sep

First Main Airborne Lift

0800 hrs to 0930 hrs 8 Sept

Second Main Airborne Lift

Evening 8 Sep or morning 9 Sep. Essential Corps HQ will land evening 8 Sep in any case.

878 Airborne Aviation Engineer Battalion

Morning 9 Sep or evening 9 Sep depending on second main airborne lift.

AFDAG

12 hrs after arrival 878 Airborne Aviation Engineer Battalion.

/.....

52 Division

Starts landing 10 Sep.

COMMUNICATIONS

7. On landing 1 Airborne Division will have wireless links to 30 Corps, Second British Army and Airborne Base. Also to Guards Arm'd Div.

When Corps HQ lands they will have communications to :-

1 Airborne Division
1 Polish Parachute Brigade
30 Corps
Second British Army
Airborne Base

At this stage direct communication from 1 Airborne Division to 30 Corps, Second British Army and Airborne Base will cease.

8. HQ 1 Airborne Division will land by glider at near KNAFFHEIDE ⁷⁵⁵² ~~7551~~ Moving thence to area MISSIEHOES ST ANNA 7060.

HQ British Airborne Corps will land by glider at near KNAFFHEIDE ⁷⁵⁵² ~~7551~~ Moving thence to EAST of the bridge over the MAAS WAAL on the axis GRAVES ELJNECHEN.

9. Seaborne Falls.

(a) Seaborne tails of Corps HQ and 1 Airborne Division are due to join 30 Corps on 8 Sep.

(b) Seaborne tail of 52 Division is due to join 30 Corps on 10 Sep.

10. Mines, Demolitions, Ferries, Barges, Locks, Water, Glider Pilots, Recognition, Passwords.

As for LINNET. Relevant extracts are attached at Appendix 'A'.

A.P.O.
ENGLAND.
6 September, 1944.
AGW/JA/FAB.

W. M. S.
Brigadier G.S.
Headquarters, Airborne Troops,
(21 Army Group)

DISTRIBUTION.....

OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO. 1

COPY NO...

INFORMATION1. Enemy

The enemy is fighting determinedly along the general line of ALBERT and ESCAUT Canals from inclusive ANTWERP to inclusive MAASTRICHT. His line is held by the remnants of some good divisions, including Parachute Divisions, and by new arrivals from HOLLAND. They are fighting well but have very few reserves. The total armoured strength is probably not more than 50-100 tanks, mostly Mark IV. There is every sign of the enemy strengthening the defences of the river and canal lines through ARNHEM and NIJMEGEN, especially with flak, but the troops manning them are not numerous and many are of low category. The flak is sited for dual purpose role - both AA and ground.

2. Own Troops

It is the intention of the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, to advance NORTH across the MAAS, WAAL and NIEDER RIJN, form a strong bridgehead NORTH of ARNHEM and continue his operations NORTH into HOLLAND and EAST against the BEICH. The main axis of the advance is EINDHOVEN - GRAVE - NIJMEGEN - ARNHEM, which is allotted to 30 Corps.

INTENTION

3. Airborne Corps will capture and hold crossings over the canals and rivers on Second Army's main axis of advance, from about EINDHOVEN to incl ARNHEM.

ORDER OF BATTLE

4. HQ British Airborne Corps
 1 British Airborne Division
 52 (L) Division (Airportable)
 1 Polish Parachute Brigade
 2 Airlanding Lt AA Bty
 PHANTOM detachments on scale of one per Corps HQ and Division
 878 US Airborne Aviation Engineer Bn
 82 US Airborne Division
 101 US Airborne Division
 Such additional units as are provided by Second British Army to assist after the ground forces have joined up.
 Liaison Missions provided by SPHQ
 Civil Affairs Staff.
 Detachment NETHERLANDS Army Commandos

COMMAND

5. Command of the whole force will be exercised by 21 Army Group through Second Army. First Allied Airborne Army have accepted responsibility for the whole protection of the air flight, including arrangements for warning ALLIED AA and balloon defences and for air-sea rescue arrangements.

6. Lt-General FAN BROWNING, CB, DSO, Commander British Airborne Corps has been designated commander of all airborne and airlanded troops together with, on arrival their seaborne elements.
7. 1 Polish Parachute Brigade is under command 1 Airborne Division for all purposes.
8. 878 Airborne Aviation Engineer Battalion is under direct control of OE British Airborne Corps for all operational purposes, except that for local protection and in emergency it will act on the orders of the Divisional Commander in whose area it is.
9. 2 Airlanding Light AA Battery remains under direct command of British Airborne Corps until it is known in which area it will be disposed.
10. A HQ Field Maintenance Centre is being provided to command all AFDA units.
11. Any SAS troops employed will be under the direct command of British Airborne Corps.
12. Brigadier J.D. RUSSELL, DSO, MC, Comd 157 Infantry Brigade will command all seaborne elements of British Airborne and Airportable formations. Lt-Col CURTIS, MC, will act as Deputy Commander and Airborne Corps Staff Officer.

Seaborne elements will be passed forward by 30 Corps as soon as the ground situation permits, and will revert under command their own formations or units on arrival.

TASKS

13. 1 British Airborne Division

Will land to capture the ARNHEM Bridges, with sufficient bridgeheads to pass formations of Second Army through.

14. 82 US Airborne Division

Will seize and hold the bridges at NIJMEGEN and GRAVE with the same object in view. The capture and retention of the high ground between NIJMEGEN and GROESBEK is imperative in order to accomplish the Division's task.

15. 101 US Airborne Division

Will seize bridges and defiles on 30 Corps' main axis of advance to ensure the speedy pass-through of that Corps to the GRAVE-NIJMEGEN and ARNHEM crossings. Definite locations will be notified shortly.

It is the intention to evacuate 82 and 101 US Airborne Divisions as soon as the ground situation permits.

16. 52 (GL) Division

Will be flown in NORTH of ARNHEM as soon as airstrips are available and will concentrate in reserve nearby, in accordance with orders which will be issued on landing. They will be prepared to fly-in their 'O' Group with the first wave of aircraft landing.

17. A summary of aircraft and gliders allotted is attached at Appendix "A".

18. Aircraft landing and returning to UK will be used for evacuation of casualties and glider pilots.

AIRLANDING OF TROOPS AND SUPPLIES

19. 878 Airborne Aviation Engineer Battalion together with Airfield Control Unit will be flown in by glider as soon as the air and ground situation permits and will prepare a landing strip or strips as decided by Corps.

Location of such strips will be notified to IX TCCP at EASTCOTE via HQ British Airborne Troops (Rear) before 878 Airborne Aviation Engineer Bn take off. IX TCCP will also be notified when the first and subsequent airstrips will be ready for operating. If possible notice will be given 12 hours in advance.

20. If, at any time, it is unsafe for aircraft to land, red Verex lights or flares in the immediate vicinity of the airstrip concerned will be used to warn them. These Verex lights or flares will not be used without the agreement of the Air Force Commander on the airstrip, except in cases of extreme emergency.

DEs LZs and AIRSTRIPS

21. As shown on trace at Appendix "B".

22. Gliders of 878 Airborne Aviation Engineer Bn, Airfield Control Units and 2 Airlanding Lt AA Bty will be landed as close as possible to the site of the airstrip.

AA DEFENCES

23. 2 Airlanding Lt AA Battery will be responsible for the AA defence of the first strip to be put in working order, under the orders of the Divisional Commander in whose area it is. Other strips cannot be provided with AA defence until the main ground forces arrive, except by fighters overhead at particular times. A recon party from the battery will accompany Corps HQ in the initial air move.

ARTILLERY

24. 30 Corps are providing Artillery Support to all three Divisions wherever range permits. Liaison officers from 82 and 101 US Airborne Divisions and No. 1 FOU will be attached to RA 30 Corps for this purpose. Exact details of support available will be known later.

ENGINEERS

25. 878 Airborne Aviation Engineer Bn will be responsible for construction or repair of landing strips under orders of CE HQ British Airborne Corps. They will be evacuated to UK and revert to command PAAA as soon as possible after their initial tasks are completed.

26. Divisional Commanders will give first priority of Engineer resources to the removal of charges from and repair and maintenance of any bridges within their areas which are likely to be required by 30 Corps in their advance. No bridges will be destroyed or prepared for destruction. Temporary minor rail cuts may be made for purposes of local defence.

27. AFDAF will include a Stores Section RE, under the direct control of 'Q' British Airborne Corps, but allotment of Engineer stores will be done by CE British Airborne Corps.

MINES

28. (a) Mines will only be laid by engineers or under engineer supervision, to ensure accurate recording.

(b) Own and enemy minefields will be reported through normal channels to Corps HQ by the quickest possible means and also in the case of enemy fields to the nearest engineer unit.

DEMOLITIONS

29. NO DEMOLITIONS OF ANY KIND AND NO DESTRUCTION OF SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS (except GERMAN field cable) will be allowed except by the express permission of the Corps Commander. This is essential to the swift advance of the Allied Armies.

FERRIES, BARGES AND LOCKS

30. All ferries, barges, etc, not actually in use by Airborne Divisions will be brought to the SOUTHERN banks of rivers or canals as soon as the situation permits in order that they are available for 30 Corps if required.

As far as possible canal locks will be kept in working order and normal water levels maintained.

AIR SUPPORT

31. (a) Direct Air Support will be provided by 83 Group RAF probably assisted by 84 Group RAF
- (b) The communication layout, frequencies, call signs and codes to be used are incorporated in a signal operation instruction.
- (c) Two American Air Support Parties are allotted each to 1 Airborne Division, 82 and 101 US Airborne Divisions and HQ Airborne Corps. One party is allotted to 52 (L) Division.
- (d) Requests for Air Support will be routed direct to Second Army from all Air Support Parties, requests from Divisions being monitored and priorities decided by Corps HQ only when necessary. On landing all sets will open up, only closing down on orders which will be given when any Division has more than one set in operation.
- (e) Indications of our own positions will be by fluorescent panels, ground strip indicators or yellow smoke candles. Panels and ground strips will be kept displayed unless enemy aircraft are active.
- (f) No coloured smoke for indication of targets will be available until the arrival of 52 (L) Division when red and blue may be used.
- (g) The bomb line is shown at Appendix "G". Formations will report changes of location of units as soon as possible on the Air Support net in order that the bomb line can be changed when necessary. Own locations may be sent in the Air Support Request Code.
- (h) Should it be necessary to engage a target inside the bomb line the formation requesting will indicate a temporary bomblines to cover that one operation only.

GLIDER PILOTS

32. Instructions regarding employment and evacuation are at Appendix "F".

ANTI-GAS

33. Respirators will NOT be carried. British Troops will carry anti-gas capes.

RECOGNITION

34. Divisions will ensure mutually that types of dress and equipment used by them are known to all other formations. US Glider Pilots will wear US parachute jerkins. British Glider Pilots have the same dress and equipment as other British Airborne Troops.

35. Yellow smoke or flares will be used to indicate positions of our own troops to friendly aircraft. Yellow celanese triangles will be used for ground to ground recognition. If available, fluorescent panels will be used to distinguish vehicles to the air.

36. Friendly DUTCH civilians properly enrolled for labour through the Civil Affairs Mission will be issued with blue and white armbands as worn by BRITISH despatch riders; they will be under the orders of Lt-Col Anthony B. HARRIS, U.S.A.A.C. at Corps HQ once they have been enrolled.

LIAISON

37. (a) With the civil population for armed activities against the enemy or for labour through the SFHQ (DUTCH) Mission. (See Appendix "C" and "D")
- (b) With the civil population for control of Civil Affairs, through the Civil Affairs Section, attached to Corps HQ. This will include control of labour, refugees, curfews, proclamations, etc.
- (c) One Liaison Officer for Corps HQ will be provided by each Division. These Liaison officers will travel with Divisional HQ to the area of operations and will be provided with transport, jeep or motor-cycle, by Divisions. After landing they will, as soon as the situation allows, report to GSO1(Ops) at Corps HQ with the latest information of their divisions and remain at his disposal.
- (d) The two Polish Liaison Officers now with Corps HQ will travel with and remain with Corps HQ.
- (e) Lt-Col H.O. WRIGHT will be the liaison officer with HQ Second British Army. Capt J.C. Bridgeman will be liaison officer with 30 Corps. Capt MILLER will join Corps HQ from Seaborne Elements as soon as they arrive in the area.
- (f) In addition to the above, the following officers have been attached to HQ Airborne Corps:-

From 18 US Airborne Corps

One 'Q' Officer
Two Engineer Officers
One Sigs Officer
One Medical Officer

From HQ 82 US Airborne Division

One 'G' Officer

From HQ 101 US Airborne Division

One 'G' Officer.

ADMINISTRATION

38. Separate instructions being issued.

INTERCOMMUNICATION

39. (a) Advance Corps HQ lands with first glider lift in area 82 US Division and moves to area alongside HQ 82 Division about 7454. Subsequent move, as soon as the situation allows will be to EAST of the Bridge over the MAAS-WAAL on the main axis GRAVES-NIJMEGEN.

(b) Main Corps HQ moves up from BRUSSELS area with 30 Corps and joins up as soon as possible.

40. Signal Layout at Appendix "F".

41. Instructions regarding frequencies and cipher to be used are being issued by CSO British Airborne Corps.

42. GHQ Liaison Regiment (PHANTOM) are providing a patrol with Corps HQ and each Division except 52 (L) Division. The patrol at Corps HQ will be in direct touch with 21 Army Group.

PASSWORDS

46. NB: Not known to ground forces linking up with Airborne Corps.

As follows:-

H Hour till 2359 Hrs D Day	Challenge Reply	RED HERET
2359 hrs D Day till 2359 hrs D+1	Challenge Reply	UNCLE SAM
2359 hrs D+1 till 2359 hrs D+2	Challenge Reply	CARRIER PIGEON
2359 hrs D+2 till 2359 hrs D+3	Challenge Reply	AIR BORNE
2359 hrs D+3 till 2359 hrs D+4	Challenge Reply	ROBERT BURNS
2359 hrs D+4 till 2359 hrs D+5	Challenge Reply	TROOP CARRIER

27. SAS Troops will be acting independantly in the area and will use the codeword NANCY to establish their identity. This codeword is NOT known to ground forces linking up with Airborne Corps.

Special Resistance Personnel will use password TELEPHONE when reporting with information to Division or Brigade intelligence staffs.

TIMING

28. 'Y' day will be 23 Sep 44.

29. There will be no briefing below battalion commander level on this operation before 19 Sep at the earliest; actual permission to brief below this level will be given by Corps HQ as the situation develops.

30. Troops will be sealed in camps or billets once general briefing has started and will NOT be released without permission from Corps HQ.

31. Gliders will NOT be loaded or reloaded until further orders.

32. ACKNOWLEDGE

APO, ENGLAND.

Sep 44.

AGW/DAB/JA

Brigadier, GS,
HQ Airborne Corps,
(21 Army Group).

DISTRIBUTION:- see list attached.

TIME OF SIGNATURE..... hrs

ISSUED TO SIGNALS

OPERATION SIXTEEN

Outline Plan

INFORMATION

1. Enemy

The enemy is fighting determinedly along the ALBERT Canal from inclusive ANTWERP to inclusive MAASTRICHT. He has elements of two infantry divisions and elements of two parachute divisions, plus a large number of flak units, holding the canal. None of these troops has yet fought the Allies in the WEST, so that they are fighting stubbornly and their morale is good. There is every sign of the enemy strengthening the river line through ARNHEM and NIJMEGEN, especially with flak. The latter is sited for dual purpose role - both A.A. and ground.

2. Own Troops

Guards Armoured Division is across the canal in the area HASSELT - HECHTEL - BOURG LEOPOLD.

50 Division and 11 Armoured Division are fighting for bridgeheads between Guards Armoured Division and ANTWERP.

15 Division is reaching ANTWERP to-day.

It is the intention of the Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group to advance NORTH across the MAAS, WAAL and NEDER RIJN, form a strong bridgehead NORTH of ARNHEM and continue his operations NORTH into HOLLAND and EAST against the REICH. The main axis of the advance is EINDHOVEN - GRAVE - NIJMEGEN - ARNHEM.

INTENTION

5. Airborne Corps will capture and hold crossings over the canals and rivers on Second Army's main axis of advance.

METHOD

4. 1 British Airborne Division

Will land and capture the ARNHEM bridges with sufficient bridgehead to pass formations of Second Army through.

82 ^[100] U.S. Airborne Division

Will seize and hold the bridges at NIJMEGEN and GRAVE with the same object in view. The capture and retention of the high ground between NIJMEGEN and GROESBEK is imperative in order to accomplish the Division's task.

101 [82] 82 U.S. Airborne Division

Will seize the following on the Second Army's main axis to ensure the speedy pass through of that Army to the GRAVE, NIJMEGEN and ARNHEM crossings:-

- a. Canal crossing 3596
- b. WALKENSWAARD
- c. KINDHOVEN
- d. Bridge in square 4425
- e. ST OEDENRODE
- f. VEGHSEL
- g. UDEN

52 (L) Division

Will be flown in NORTH of ARNHEM as soon as airfields are available.

LIFTS

5. In principle as for LINNET

TIMINGS

6. Preferably late evening, but will probably have to accept morning owing to 8th Air Force support.

INTER-COMMUNICATION

7. H.Q. Airborne Corps will have direct links with 30 Corps, Second Army and 21 Army Group.

101 [82] U.S. Airborne Division will have two direct links - one to Second Army and one to 30 Corps.

Other signal lay-out, including air support, as for LINNET.

ADMINISTRATION

8. Supply will be by air for the whole force.

TAILS

9. 1 British Airborne Division - 30 Corps, as for COMET
Tails for American Divisions as for LINNET.

SUPPORTING UNITS

10. Any supporting A/Tk guns or reconnaissance units required by American Airborne Divisions will be supplied by Second Army.

10 Sep 44

OPERATION 'MARKET'

1 Airborne Div Op Instr No. 9

Date 12 Sept 44

Copy No. 28...

Confirmatory Notes on G.O.C.'s Verbal Orders

Ref Maps: 1/25000 GSGS 4427, GINKEL 388, EDE 387, REMEN 5 NE, ARNHEM 6 N.W.
1/100000 GSGS 2541 Sheets 2 and 5.
" 4416 Sheet P.1.

INFM

1. (a) Issued verbally.
- (b) 1 Polish Para Bde Gp is under comd.

INTENTION

2. 1 Airborne Div will seize ARNHEM 7378 and the crossings over the NEDER RIJN and est a bridgehead to the NORTH of that town.

METHOD

3. Aircraft allotment

As for Op 'LINNET' - practically Scale 'Y'.

4. The Div will land in three lifts.

(a) First lift.

Tac Div Hq
1 Airlanding Recce Sqn
1 Lt Regt (less one bty).

1 Para Bde.
1 A tk Bty RA
1 Para Sqn RE
16 Para Fd Amb.

1 Airlanding Bde (less certain sub-units)
9 Fd Coy RE
181 Airlanding Fd Amb.

(b) Second lift.

4 Para Bde
4 Para Sqn RE
133 Para Fd Amb
2 A tk Bty RA

One bty Lt Regt

Balance Div glider element

Balance 1 Airlanding Bde

Re-supply

(c) Third lift

1 Polish Para Bde Gp (less Lt Bty).

TasksFirst lift5. 1 Para Bde with under comd

1 A tk Bty
 1 Para Sqn RE
 Dets 9 Pd Coy RE
 16 Para Pd Amb
 Recce Sqn (less one tp)

DZ 'X'

LZ 'Z'

will (a) Seize and hold ARNHEM in order of priority

(i) Main br at 746768

(ii) Pontoon br at 738774

(b) On arrival of second lift, seize and occupy sector allotted.

(c) Occupy part of 1 Polish Para Bde sector until it arrives with third lift.

(d) Cover DZ 'K' during the drop of 1 Polish Para Bde.

(e) After Div sector has been occupied, make one bn available at short notice for Div res.

6. 1 Airlanding Bde with under comd

181 Airlanding Pd Amb

LZ 'S'

will (a) Secure LZs 'S' and 'Z'
DZ 'X'

and cover unloading of first lift.

(b) Est posts at

(i) Rd EDE 5785 - ARNHEM in vicinity of FLANKEN WABENIS 6683.

(ii) Rd MAG-ENINGEN 5876 - ARNHEM in vicinity of RENKUM 6276.

(c) Protect the arrival of the second lift

on DZs 'Y' and 'X'
LZ 'S' and 'Z'.

(d) After unloading of second lift has been completed, seize and occupy the sector allotted.

(e) Protect landing of Polish gliders in third lift

on LZ 'L'.

7. Reece Sqn

- (a) Less one tp will come under cmd 1 Para Bde for seizure of hrs at ARNHEM. Dets 9 Pd Coy will be under cmd.
- (b) One tp Div res to RV HALLE WOLFHESEN 665805.
- (c) On completion task with 1 Para Bde will revert to Div and RV HELJONORD 725785. Dets 9 Pd Coy revert CRE.
- (d) Div task - reece in priority - rd
- | | | | |
|-------------|------|---|--------|
| APPELDORN | 7803 | = | ARNHEM |
| " ZUTPHEN | 9494 | = | " |
| " ZEVENHAR | 8571 | = | " |
| " NIJMEGEN | 7062 | = | " |
| " AGENINGEN | 5876 | = | " |
| EDE | 5785 | | |

8. 21 Indep Para Coy

will mark

DZs 'X' 'Y' 'K'.
 LZs 'S' 'Z' 'L'.
 SDF 'V'.

for first, second and third lifts.

On completion task will RV DER BRINK. 718779

9. R.A.(a) Arty

- (i) Lt Regt less one bty under cmd GRA.
 3 Lt Bty in sp 1 Para Bde.
 1 Lt Bty in sp 1 Airlanding Bde.
- (ii) Initial gun area 6779 - 3 Bty moving to 6977.
- (iii) FOCs as detailed by GRA.

(b) A tk

- (i) 1 A tk Bty (less one 17-pr tp) under cmd 1 Para Bde.
- (ii) One 17-pr tp for protection of Div tps.

10. R.E.(a) 1 Para Sqn RE

On arrival second lift, 1 Para Sqn (less one tp remaining under cmd 1 Para Bde) reverts to under cmd CRE. Sqn RV POLAR STATION 753768.

(b) 9 Pd Coy RE and det 261 Pd Pk Coy RE

- (i) 2 dets 9 Pd Coy under cmd Reece Sqn.
 Task to neutralise and remove charges on hrs.
 On arrival second lift, dets revert to under cmd 9 Pd Coy.
 RV T. FELLAAN 717792.

- (ii) One tp 2 Pz Coy under comd 1 Airlanding Bde from time of arrival LZ.
- (iii) 9 Pz Coy RE (less one tp and dets) and det 261 Pz Pk Coy under comd GRE. RV TAFELLAAN 717792.

11. Tac Div

Lands on LZ '2'. RV track juno 657797, thence main rd JACSHINGEN - ARNHEM.
Opens ARTILLERIE PARK 7378.

TasksSecond lift

12. 4 Para Bde with under comd
- 4 Para Sqn RE
133 Para Pz Amb
2 A tk Bty RA

DZ 'Y'

LZ 'X'

- (a) Seize and occupy sector allotted.
Axis of movement rd EDE - ARNHEM.
- (b) Occupy part of sector allotted to 1 Polish Para Bde until its arrival with third lift.

13. R.A.(a) Arty

- (1) 2 Lt Bty in sp 4 Para Bde.
- (ii) Gun area for Lt Regt in main position 7177.

(b) A tk

- (1) 1 A tk Bty reverts under comd CRA and in sp 4 Para Bde.
- (ii) 2 A tk Bty (less one 17-pr tp) in sp 4 Para Bde.
- (iii) Two 17-pr tps and one 6-pr tp in Div res under CRA.

14. R.E.4 Para Sqn RE

On arrival third lift, 4 Para Sqn RE (less one tp remaining under comd 4 Para Bde) reverts to under comd GRE.

RV ARNHEM ly sta 732782.

15. Re-supply

35 stirlings on LZ '1'.

Principal contents gun amm and mortar bombs. Some pet.

TasksThird lift16. 1 Polish Para Bde Gp

DZ 'K'

LZ 'L'

will occupy sector allotted with a minimum of delay.

17. Re-supply

100 aircraft plus DZ 'V'.

18. Method of occupation

Bdes will put out false front and standing patrols as far as is practicable. No attempt at co-ordination by Div will be made until arrival on ground and resources and situation are known.

19. Bomb line(a) As from H hr until second lift + 6 hrs

785855 - 768852 - 750846 - 737845 - 730844 - 715845 - 708851 -
695852 - 676853 - 659853 - 639853 - 628853 - 613855.

(b) As from second lift + 6 hrs (i.e. not before 1100 hrs D+1)

629852 - 629842 - 630824 - 628807 - 623788 - 616772 - 614759.

(c) Bde Comds will submit targets on which they wish pre-briefed bombing either before or after H hr.

20. Glider pilots

Will remain with units landed until Div sector has been occupied.

Then: One bn remains under command of Airlanding Bde.
One bn in Div res RV SONSBECK 743785.

21. Timings(a) First lift.

H hr (main glider lift starts landing) approx 1400 hrs D day,
but not before 1000 hrs.

(b) Second and third lifts

As early as possible on D+1 and D+2.

22. Briefing

No briefing below unit comds and heads of services without further instra from Div Hq.

23. Recognition signs

(a) Ground to air: yellow smoke or flares, and yellow fluorescent panels, if available.

(b) Ground to ground: yellow celanese triangles.

24.

Passwords

H hr. until 2359 hrs D day

2359 hrs D day until 2359 hrs D+1

2359 hrs D+1 until 2359 hrs D+2

2359 hrs D+2 until 2359 hrs D+3

2359 hrs D+3 until 2359 hrs D+4

2359 hrs D+4 until 2359 hrs D+5

Challenge

Reply

Challenge

Reply

Challenge

Reply

Challenge

Reply

Challenge

Reply

Challenge

Reply

RED

BERET

UNCLE

SAM

CARRIAGE

PIGEON

AIR

BORNE

ROBERT

BURNS

TROOP

CARRIER

ADM

25.

Issued separately.

26.

Col. H.N. BARLOW, Deputy Comd 1 Airlanding Bde, is appointed Town Commandant, AENHEM. He will maintain close touch with Comd 1 Para Bde and will co-ordinate the tasks of the A.P.M. and O.C. Pd Security Sec.

INTERCOMV

27.

Sigs instrs issued separately.

28.


Only 30 Corps list of code names for places, as issued for COMET, will be used. Plans and units may, however, give code names to important routes, axes of advance, or detailed objectives, at their discretion.

MTK.Time of Signature: *1530 hrs.*Method of Despatch: *By hand.*

CB Macnamara
Lt. Col., G.S.,
1 Airborne Division.

TAG HQDISTRIBUTION

Copy No.				Copy No.			
1 Para Bde	1	R.A.S.C.	17
4 Para Bde	2	Med	18
1 Airlanding Bde	3	A.P.M.	19
Recon Sqdn	4	Ord	20
R.A.	5	Recon	21
R.E.	6	Pro	22
Sigs	7	Hq Airtps (6)	23 - 28
21 Indep Para Coy	8	52 (L) Div	29
1 Polish Para Bde	9	82 U.S. Airborne Div	30
G.O.C.	10	101 U.S. Airborne Div	31
G(Ops)	11	Comd Glider Pilots (3)	32 - 34
1 Airborne Div (Main) (2)	12 - 13	G.S.O.1 (Air) IX T.C.G.	35
G(Air)	14	G.S.O.1 (Air) 36 Gp R.A.E.	36
G(Int)	15	War Diary (2)	37 - 38
A/Q	16	File	39
				Spares	40 - 50



HEADQUARTERS
TROOP CARRIER FORCES
NAVIGATION DIAGRAM
NO. 2
FOR OPERATION
MARKET
ANNEX NO. 3 TO FM 100-4

MAP REFERENCE
1:500,000 SCALE
SHEET 3, 4, 5
1:100,000 SCALE
SHEET 3, 4, 5

TOP SECRET
NO. 100-100-100
NO. 100-100-100
NO. 100-100-100
NO. 100-100-100

Appx "D" to 21 AGP/20748/1/G(Plans)
dated 4 Sep 44.

I - DEFINITION OF BOUNDARY BETWEEN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AND RUSSIAN SPHERES OF
OCCUPATION WITHIN GERMANY.

1. (a) The territory of GERMANY (including the province of EAST PRUSSIA) situated to the EAST of a line drawn from the point on LUBECK BAY where the frontiers of SCHLESWIG - HOLSTEIN and MECKLENBURG meet, along the Western frontier of MECKLENBURG to the frontier of the province of HANOVER, thence along the Eastern frontier of HANOVER, to the frontier of BRUNSWICK; thence along the Western frontier of the PRUSSIAN province of SAXONY to the Western frontier of ANHALT ; thence along the Western frontier of ANHALT ; thence along the Western frontier of the PRUSSIAN province of SAXONY and the Western frontier of THURINGIA to where the latter meets the BAVARIAN frontier, thence Eastwards along the Northern frontier of BAVARIA to the 1937 CZECHOSLOVAKIAN frontier, will be occupied by armed forces of the USSR with exception of the BERLIN area, for which a special system of occupation is provided below.
 - (b) The territory of GERMANY situated to the WEST of the line defined above will be occupied by Allied Armed Forces under Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.
2. The frontiers of states (LANDER) and provinces within GERMANY, referred to in the foregoing descriptions of the zones, are those which existed after the coming into effect of the decree of 25th June, 1941, (published in the Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, No 72 3rd July, 1941).

II - DEFINITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ZONE - BERLIN

3. The International Zone will comprise the City of BERLIN, by which expression is understood the territory of "Greater BERLIN" as defined by the law of 27th April, 1920. For this purpose the territory of "Greater BERLIN" will be divided into three zones :-
- (a) North-Eastern part of the City (districts of PANKOW, PRENZLAUERBERG, MITTE, WEISSENSEE, FRIEDERICHSHAIN, TREPTOW, KOPENICK) will be occupied by the forces of the USSR.
 - (b) North-Western part of the City (districts of REINICKENDORF, WEDDING, TIEGARTEN, CHARLOTTENBURG, SPANDAU, WILMERSDORF) will be occupied by BRITISH forces.
 - (c) Southern part of the City (districts of Zehlendorf, STEGLITZ, SVHONEBERG, KREUTZBERG, TEMPELHOF, NEUKOLLN) will be occupied by forces of the USA.
4. The boundaries of districts within "Greater BERLIN" referred to in the foregoing descriptions, are those which existed after the coming into effect of the decree published on 27th March, 1938, (Amtablatt der Reichshauptstadt BERLIN No 13 of 27th March, 1938, page 215).
5. Until the Tripartite Government assumes control in the international zone of BERLIN, the BRITISH and US zones in BERLIN will be treated as one zone under the control of the Supreme Commander.

~~TOP SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY

APO 740, U S Army
12 September 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO: : Brig General RALPH F. STEARLEY.

OPERATION MARKET

Accompanied by Lt Colonel Larocque, I attended General Brownings meeting of Commanders and Staffs. at Moor Park, this morning at which the following points were, in connection with Operation MARKET, raised:

1. A summary of allocation of aircraft according to lifts was read and agreed by all concerned. A copy is attached.

2. General Williams pointed out that owing to the reduced number of hours of daylight and increase in distance, it would not be possible to consider more than one lift per day.

3. General Gavin raised the question of re-supply. He pointed out that if only one lift per day was to take place, he would not be able to have his re-supply until D plus 3 which was too late, on account of the D plus 2 lift, now being his third lift, ie. his second glider lift. General Browning stated that if the ground situation proved as favourable as he anticipated, it might not be necessary to have a third lift of gliders but that re-supply might take the place of gliders. General Gavin stated that he did not wish to forego his glider lift on D plus 2 as it would alter his ground plan considerably; he suggested that every effort be made by Headquarters, First Allied Airborne Army to obtain bombers to under take re-supply on D plus 2.

General Williams pointed out that even if the third lift had to carry supplies he would still be able to provide a lift at the same time of approximately 200 gliders.

General Browning ^{requested} suggested me to notify him as early as possible whether or not bombers could be obtained for this task. G-4 have been requested to ascertain the number of bombers required.

4. General Browning stated that as there were only sufficient aircraft available in the third lift to carry 50% of 878th Eng. Bn. He would prefer to bring them over in the fourth lift on D plus 3, and therefore it was unlikely that the 52nd (L) Division could start landing before D plus 4 or possibly D plus 5.

~~TOP SECRET~~

L. T. Brown
Colonel

ALLOCATION OF AIRCRAFT.

Operation Market

FIRST LIFT	PARA A/C			TUG A/C			GLIDERS			GLIDER PILOTS		REMARKS
	38 Gp	46 Gp	IX TOC	38 Gp	46 Gp	IX TOC	HAN	HCR	CGA	BRITISH	AMERICAN	
101 (US) Airborne Div			432			70			70			
82 (US) Airborne Div			480			50			50			
1 Airborne Div	12		143	190	130		13	307				
H.Q. Airborne Corps				39				33	6			
TOTAL	12		1055	228		120	13	339	126			
SECOND LIFT												
	38 Gp	46 Gp	IX TOC	38 Gp	46 Gp	IX TOC	HAN	HCR	CGA	BRITISH	AMERICAN	
101 (US) Airborne Div						450			450			
82 (US) Airborne Div						450			450			
1 Airborne Div			126	146	110		15	229	4			
Polish Para Bde				10				10				
Resupply				35								
TOTAL			126	191	110	900	15	239	904			
THIRD LIFT												
	38 Gp	46 Gp	IX TOC	38 Gp	46 Gp	IX TOC	HAN	HCR	CGA	BRITISH	AMERICAN	
101 (US) Airborne Div						382			382			
82 (US) Airborne Div						402			402			
Polish Indep. Para Bde			114	35				35				
Resupply	100	100										
TOTAL	100	100	114	35		782		35	782			

) Possibly these could
) be turned over to resupply

"MARKET"

TOP SECRET
SECRET

OPERATION (SIXTH)

Outline Plan

INFORMATION

1. Enemy

*100% destroyed 10 June 45
at Breda, Neth.*

The enemy is fighting determinedly along the ALBERT Canal from inclusive ANTWERP to inclusive MAASTRICHT. He has elements of two infantry divisions and elements of two parachute divisions, plus a large number of flak units, holding the canal. None of these troops has yet fought the Allies in the WEST, so that they are fighting stubbornly and their morale is good. There is every sign of the enemy strengthening the river line through ARNHEM and NIJMEGEN, especially with flak. The latter is sited for dual purpose role - both A.A. and ground.

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15 Division is reaching ANTWERP to-day.

It is the intention of the Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group to advance NORTH across the MAAS, WAAL and NEDER RIJN, form a strong bridgehead NORTH of ARNHEM and continue his operations NORTH into HOLLAND and EAST against the REICH. The main axis of the advance is EINDHOVEN - GRAVE - NIJMEGEN - ARNHEM.

INTENTION

3. Airborne Corps will capture and hold crossings over the canals and rivers on Second Army's main axis of advance.

METHOD

4. 1 British Airborne Division

Will land and capture the ARNHEM bridges with sufficient bridgehead to pass formations of Second Army through.

82 101 U.S. Airborne Division

Will seize and hold the bridges at NIJMEGEN and GRAVE with the same object in view. The capture and retention of the high ground between NIJMEGEN and GROSSEBEEK is imperative in order to accomplish the Division's task.

SECRET

- 2 -

101st U.S. Airborne Division

Will seize the following on the Second Army's main axis to ensure the speedy pass through of that Army to the GRAVE, NIJMEGEN and ARNHEM crossings:-

- a. Canal crossing 3596
- b. WALKENSWAARD
- c. HINDHOVEN
- d. Bridge in square 4425
- e. ST ORDENRODE
- f. VEGHEL
- g. UDEN

52 (L) Division

Will be flown in NORTH of ARNHEM as soon as airfields are available.

LIFTS

- 5. In principle as for LINNET

TIMINGS

- 6. Preferably late evening, but will probably have to accept morning owing to 8th Air Force support.

INTER-COMMUNICATION

- 7. H.Q. Airborne Corps will have direct links with 30 Corps, Second Army and 21 Army Group.

101st U.S. Airborne Division will have two direct links - one to Second Army and one to 30 Corps.

Other signal lay-out, including air support, as for LINNET.

ADMINISTRATION

- 8. Supply will be by air for the whole force.

TAILS

- 9. 1 British Airborne Division - 30 Corps, as for COMET
Tails for American Divisions as for LINNET.

SUPPORTING UNITS

- 10. Any supporting A/Tk guns or reconnaissance units required by American Airborne Divisions will be supplied by Second Army.

10 Sep 44

Sheet 1 of Sheets.
of Copies

APD 109, U.S. Army
11 September 1944

OPERATION "MARKET"

PRELIMINARY TACTIC I. STUDY OF THE TERRAIN

1. PURPOSE.

To study the area of operations of the 82nd and 101st AB Divisions in Operation "MARKET".

2. GENERAL TOPOGRAPHY OF AREA.

a. Drainage. The area is drained toward's the NW by the ROMEL, AA, and LETGRAF Rivers in the EINDHOVEN-VEGHEL-UDEN area, and to the W by the MAAS, through GRAVE, and the WAAL, through NIJMEGEN. Virtually the entire area is thickly veined with drainage ditches and canals. The principal canals are the MEUSE-ESCAUT, running E-W through the extreme S end of the area; the S branch of the WILLEM Canal, running to the NW near VEGHEL; the WILHELMINA, to the W just N of EINDHOVEN, and the MAAS-WAAL, connecting those two parallel rivers just W of NIJMEGEN.

b. Ridge System. Virtually none, except for one very pronounced N-S ridge about 5 miles long, between NIJMEGEN and GROESBEEK, rising to 200 to 300 feet above the polder-land. (A polder is the land surrounded by a dike, and generally below river or sea-level.)

c. Routes.

- (1) Highways. The entire sector lies astride one of the principal highway routes from HASSELT to the N of HOLLAND. In addition, a National Highway runs SE-NW through EINDHOVEN, with a secondary road to the E. National Highways converge on NIJMEGEN, from the SE, S, and the SW; the latter passing through GRAVE. Northward from NIJMEGEN, a National Highway splits after crossing the WAAL and merges again a few miles S of ARNHEIM.
- (2) Railroads. One railroad runs S-N through VALKENSWAARD to EINDHOVEN, then swings E and NW. Another connects VEGHEL and UDEN, running generally WSW - ESE. Two lines converge from S and W at NIJMEGEN and continue N.

d. General Nature of the Terrain. Flat, below river-level, cut by dikes and ditches; sprinkled with small patches of woods.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN.

a. Avenues of Approach and Lines of Communication. Only feasible approaches are along the roads and railroads. Cross-country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. Communications are dependent upon possession of bridges, or alternatively, water-borne transport on the canals and rivers.

b. Obstacles. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches. The countryside can be inundated.

c. Concealment and Cover. Generally available only in the patches of woods, villages, and farm buildings, and behind dikes or in ditches.

d. Observation. The NIJMEGEN-GROESBEEK ridge affords excellent observation in all directions for that sector. Elsewhere, only the dikes, occasional small

positions of 20-30 feet above the polders, and church steeples, offer the only vantage points.

a. Fields of Fire. Good for all types of weapons.

4. CRITICAL TERRAIN FEATURES.

a. The NIEVEN-CROSBEEK Ridge.

b. Crossings over the WAAL River, the MAAS River, the WAAL-MAAS Canal, the AA River, the WILHELM Canal, the ROER River, the WILHELMINA Canal and its feeder at Eindhoven, and the MUSE-ESCHUT Canal.

5. TACTICAL EFFECT OF THE TERRAIN.

Possession of the above-mentioned terrain features by our forces would block the enemy's withdrawal to the R. and force him into the H. His escape route then would be cut to a 30-mile-wide neck between the MAAS River and the ZUIDER ZEE.

S. W. K.
BACK,
G-2

ANNEXES:

- A - Rivers and Canals
- B - Air Fields
- C - Weather
- D - Order of Battle
- E - Strategic Engineering Study of Terrain

DISTRIBUTION:

82nd AB Div - 150 copies
101st AB Div - 150 copies
G-2, F-4A - 2 copies
I.O., Br AB Force - 2 copies

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10 June 45
C. B. M. D. L.
C. W. O. L. H.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G2.

GBI/OI-F/385.2-2

10 Sep 44.

Subject: Enemy Defences in the area ARNHEM-EINDHOVEN-VALKENSWAARD

To : G-2
Headquarters,
Allied Airborne Army.

No prepared defence line is known in this area.

Our GBI/OI-F/385.2-2 dated 4 Sep 44 contains all information available with regard to the ARNHEM-NIJMEGEN area. The following details are additional for the Southern part of the area.

Ref. Map G.S.G.S. 4083 Sheet 51, EINDHOVEN.

<u>Ref. Map.</u>	<u>Particulars.</u>
385197	Strongpoint, 4 small camouflaged pillboxes sited for all round defence.
381202	Pillbox 70 x 40 ft. and 4 M.G. pits on opposite bank of canal several small strongpoints.
435167-431164 393169-395172	25ft wide anti-tank ditch. Probable M.G. pits extending from large building to cross-roads.
370177	Strongpoint, trench system extends to 369178.
371206	M.G. positions. Wire belt enclosing these, includes the buildings at 373206 and 373207.
340218	Large area in wood has been cleared. Possible that light flak may be installed.
4108-4012	Large blockhouse camouflaged as a farmhouse on road between WAALRE (4012) and VALKENSWAARD (4108)

All bridges over the MAAS are reported to be mined or prepared for mining.

The following is the complete state of flak in the area as known at present:-

EINDHOVEN.

352184	-	6 Hy.	374199	-	1 S/L.
367193	-	3 Lt.	377197	-	3 Lt.
365196	-	Single Lt.	379200	-	3 Lt.
368183	-	3 Lt.	383194	-	2 Lt.
366185	-	1 S/L.	383199	-	1 S/L.
371214	-	12 Hy.	385181	-	3 Lt.
370208	-	1 S/L.	388193	-	3 Lt.
373206	-	3 Lt.	398190	-	6 Hy

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/414187.....

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VEN.

414187 - 3 Lt.
415191 - 3 Lt.
419188 - 3 Lt.
420193 - 3 Lt.
423192 - 3 Lt.
429182 - 3 Lt.
433188 - 3 Lt.
442192 - 6 Hy.

NIJMEGEN 4083/Sheet 40.

639667 - 1 S/L
684636 - 1 S/L.
685644 - 3 Lt.
686642 - 3 Lt.
694637 - 3 Lt.

703643 - 3 Lt.
705631 - 3 Lt.
715634 - 3 Lt.
720630 - 3 Lt.
703664 - 6 Hy, 1 unocc.
681628 - 6 Hy, 1 unocc.

AMSTERDAM 4083/Sheet 40

702832 - 6 Hy.
702830 - 3 Lt.
712769 - 3 Lt.
726772 - 6 Hy.
733805 - 6 Hy.
753754 - 6 Hy.
777763 - 3 Lt.
794781 - 6 Hy.
851730 - 1 S/L.

Ext: 732.

Matthew Nash Capt
for E.C. MALET-WARDEN.
Captain.
for A.J. BEATTIE.
Major. IC.
E-2. OI.

BRIDGE DETAILS

Serial	River	Map ref	Place	Constructional Details	Water width	Length	Rd width	Load class	Remarks
1	Canal between the WAAL and MAAS	GSGS 2541 Sht 5 1/100000 671606	NEERBOSCH	steel Single span/arch truss 1: 200	145	225	20	-	Double track ry bridge immediately to the South.
2	MAAS	Sht 5 619542	GRAVE	9 span steel bowspring on masonry piers and abutments. 6 land spans, 3 water spans. Right water span over lock. 2 : 150, 3 : 185, 4 : 150	535	1785	25	70	Likely to flood. High embanked approaches.
3	AA River	480377	VEGHEL	Single reinf conc arch 1: 90	70	120	20		
4	ZUID WILLEMS VAART	473369	VEGHEL	Single span steel girder, 1 : 50	540	75	10		
5	WILHELMINA Canal	443256	ZON	2 span steel girder swing bridge with projecting masonry abutments and large centre masonry pivot pier. 2 : 40	85	110	12		
6	JUNCTION DE LA MEUSE A L'ESCAUT	Sht 4 354961	DE GROOT	Timber decking on R.S.Js trestles of steel and timber on conc piers. 5 span.	120	155	20	24	No minechambers.

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HEADQUARTERS
FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY

83
6-2
APO 740 U S Army
10 September 1944

Minutes of a meeting called by Commanding General,
First Allied Airborne Army, held at 1800 hours:

PRESENT: Lt. Gen. L. H. Brereton, FAAA
Lt. Gen. F. A. W. Browning, Br A/B Trs
Maj. Gen. P. L. Williams, IX TCC
AVM L. N. Hollinghurst, 38 Gp
Brig. Gen. F. L. Parks, FAAA
Brig. Gen. R. F. Stearley, FAAA
Brig. Gen. Stuart Cutler, FAAA
Brig. Gen. J. M. Gavin, 82nd A/B Div
Brig. Gen. A. C. McAuliffe, 101st A/B Div
Brig. Gen. T. E. Buechler, XVIII Corps
Brig. Power, Br A/B Trs
Brig. R. F. K. Goldsmith, FAAA
Brig. G. Walch, British A/B Trs
Colonel Frank Ward, FAAA
Colonel J. A. Cella, FAAA
Colonel R. P. Eaton, XVIII Corps
Colonel H. Whalley-Kelly, FAAA
Lt. Col. J. D. Henry, FAAA
Lt. Col. D. H. Likes, FAAA
Lt. Col. Jos. LaRocque, FAAA
Lt. Col. Jack Whitfield, XVIII Corps
Lt. Col. J. W. Oberdorf, IX TCCC
Lt. Col. J. G. Brown, XVIII Corps
Lt. Col. R. D. Millener, 101 A/B Div
Lt. Col. Hugh Barclay, FAAA
Major John Norton, 82nd A/B Div
Captain Clark Thornton, 82nd A/B Div

General Brereton called the meeting to order,
following which General Browning read an outline of the
proposed plan.

General Brereton requested information as to when
the IX Troop Carrier Command could martial all its craft,
to which General Williams responded that he had 220 air-
craft stationed in France at the present time and it would
take approximately 24 hours to assemble all craft in the
United Kingdom; that if this operation paralleled the
LINNET setup it would be a simple matter to get his craft
formed up.

General Browning stated he had told Marshal Montgomery
that the operation could not be scheduled until the 15-16 at
the earliest.

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Copy destroyed 31 May 45
Ch. Benedict, lwo, w/ [unclear]
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AVM Hollinghurst stated that they could be ready within 24 hours; that they were actually ready now except for the 46th Group which was on supply duty but could be gotten back.

General Brereton stated that we would comply with 21st Army Group's intentions and desires when these were ascertained and that timing would be our greatest question; that the factors most affecting the time element would be the obtaining of additional photo coverage, maps, detailed planning, and whatever air preparation might be necessary.

General Browning stated it was his opinion the movement of the two American divisions would also enter into the time element.

General Williams stated that the lift would have to be modified, due to the distance involved, which precluded the use of double tow lift and meant that single tow only could be employed.

General Brereton stated that no change of martialling areas was involved.

General Browning advised that the 101st A/B Division could be briefed with all of the material the 1st British Division has now.

General Brereton felt that the time set by General Browning should allow ample time for all arrangements. He also believed it better if the time could be made sooner so that if weather prevented an operation the date could be set back; that the date should not be considered a final date but merely a figurative date to give ample leeway to have everything completed by that date and that if we could step things up and have things just as complete by the middle of the week we could then decide whether the date could be set up 24 hours.

Brigadier Walch stated that a definite date must be set in order for them to make arrangements for briefing and once the date was set it would be rather awkward to advance the date due to their time schedule.

General Williams recommended that the 101st Division should take the southern route and that the 82nd Division should come straight across.

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General Brereton announced that in view of what General Williams said he accepted the outline that General Browning had submitted with the exception that the areas assigned to the 82nd and 101st Divisions should be changed in order that the 101st Division could take the southern route.

General Cutler announced that the name of this operation had been designated as MARKET.

General Stearley suggested coming into the area by way of Antwerp as earlier considered and that all serials should use that route.

General Williams desired to suspend freight hauling tomorrow as it would take 48 hours to get his aircraft back; that the 48th Group was in the same predicament. General Brereton directed General Parks to get a message to the Supreme Commander concerning this.

Brigadier Goldsmith brought up the question of the use of bombers for resupply. General Brereton stated that if the same assurances are given for this operation as for LINNET, bombers would be made available.

Brigadier Goldsmith stated that resupply by air would be for a period of ten days.

General Gavin asked if the British would administer evacuation and supply of the American divisions, to which General Browning responded that the Second Army would supply transportation and any units desired.

General Stearley stated that the question of two lifts was important; that it was necessary to have good preparation by the Eighth Air Force on the routes and area; that we could not drop at daylight and get good effective preparation; that if we went in in the evening we would have the entire day to prepare.

General McAuliffe desired to know when he could expect coverage. Colonel Cella stated it could be expected by midnight tomorrow for one copy, and six additional copies not later than 12 hours thereafter.

Colonel Cella stated that it would take 48 hours to reproduce maps in sufficient quantities for this operation, starting immediately. General Brereton directed Colonel Cella to insure that everything possible was being done to accelerate production of maps and that nothing was being overlooked.

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General Browning stated he would report to General Brereton tomorrow evening on what he considered the 101st Division would be able to do.

General Brereton announced that tomorrow night will be the day on which the date will be definitely set.

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MC

NOTES ON CONFERENCE, GENERAL STEARLEY AND G-3 STAFF
1000, 13 SEPTEMBER

D day is the 17th.

6th Airborne is taken care of allright. They have a directive to help train the 17th.

We will haul freight hard today.

G-3 Section is to get some more airborne people. Boyer and Feegan are coming to the "3" section. RAF personnel are coming for the "3" section.

Major Nelson is to obtain the names of glider personnel qualified in this section, and turn the list into Colonel Ward.

Seaborne tails brought up. Apparently, they are to go.

General Bull thinks the units should remain on the continent after the operation. British troops in British area. Our troops in area of First Army. General Stearley favors the area of the Third Army. Seaborne tails can join up.

Colonel Hobbs and Col. Larocque to study the areas to put the 1st, 101st and 82nd Divisions on the continent after the operation. General trend now is that after the operation they will remain on the continent.

Supply by B-24s. People need to be trained. One plane at each field should be furnished for this training. Over 300 aircraft (B-24s) needed for resupply. Lt. Col. Bartley to contact Eighth AF on this matter. Let the Eighth decide whether they want the ball turrets removed or not. Stearlings are used for resupply. Halifaxes can be used, but they are not ideal. Also plans worked out for the British Heavy Bombers to be used for passenger transportation service if situation warrants their employment in this manner.

Flak situation is rough. A flak recce mission is being flown on Northern route now. Forward line of Southern route is bad. One town 25 miles across line and another 15 miles further north are bad. Along path of craft, flak is bad. Flak officer will figure out how many flak guns (heavy and light) will bear on our craft on the route. General Stearley wants to talk with General Anderson, and then see General Brereton with General Parks and tell them how many guns can bear on this thing, and what our chances of getting in are. DeRussey stated bombers couldn't be used for resupply, because bombers couldn't get low enough due to flak to drop supplies with any degree of accuracy. If that is

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true, this is ill conceived and must not go on. Routes must be obtained as soon as possible. Flak officer will furnish an estimate of the mobile flak situation, and how many main roads are crossed. How many fixed guns, heavy and light can fire on us as we go in.

Lt. Col. Bartley to get in touch with P.L. Williams or Max Taylor. Taylor has seen Dempsey. Cut down to two areas instead of seven. Col. Bartley to get routes in and location of DZs and LZs.

Final decision was that the 101st goes in in two areas;- a division less a combat team, and a combat team.

Obtained + gave lat + long to Maj. Lowe -
Understand 101 DZ changed again!

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HEADQUARTERS
FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY

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: ~~SECRET~~ :
: Auth: CG, FAAA: :
: Date: : :
: Init: : :
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APC 740, U. S. Army
10 September 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Chief of Staff, FAAA. (Through G-3, FAAA)

1. Information desired re lift capabilities of the First Allied Airborne Army is given herewith.

a. Required lift

Unit to be lifted	Preht A/C	Wacos	Horsas	Hamilears	Lift by
82 A/B Div	483	904	0	0	IX TCG
101 A/B Div	432	904	0	0	IX TCG
17 A/B Div	345	1100	0	0	IX TCG
British 1st Div (incl Hq A/B Corp)	275	0	572	28	125 to 150 preht a/c by IX TCG. All others by 38 & 46 Groups.
1st Brig (Polish)	114	160	or 85		Preht a/c by IX TCG. Horsas by Br. Wacos by US.
878 A/B Engrs	0	144	0	10	Wacos by IX TCG Hamilears by 38 Group.
A/F Control Parties and Miscellaneous	0	10 (Variable)	5 (Variable)	0	Wacos by IX TCG Horsas by Br

b. Available lift

Type A/C	IX TCG	38 Gp	46 Gp	Total
G-47 or Dakota	1300	0	150	1450
Stirling	0	156	0	156
Albemarle	0	52	0	52
Halifax	0	40	0	40
1020 Totals	1300	248	150	1698

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Conflicting reports of strength of 38 and 46 Groups have been received. The above figures on those two units were received direct from A.V.M. Hollinghurst.

2. Study of above data indicates: -

a. With all IX TCG a/c available, the following can be moved in one lift.

- (1) The 82 A/B Div complete, or the 101 A/B Div complete, or the 17 A/B Div less 14% of its gliders by the IX TCG.
- (2) The Polish 1st Brig complete, or half the British 1st Div, by the 38 and 46 Groups.

b. With half the IX TCG a/c available the following can be moved in one lift.

- (1) The parachute lift and approximately one-fourth of the glider lift of the 82 Div or the parachute lift and approximately one-third of the glider lift of the 101 Div or the parachute lift and approximately one-third of the glider lift of the 17 Div, by the IX TCG.
- (2) The Polish Brigade complete, or one-half of the British 1st Div, by the 38 and 46 Groups.

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c. Various combination lifts could also be moved; e.g., the A/B Engineers could be moved at the expense of 144 glider loads of the U. S. Infantry Divisions, etc. The above figures, however, represent the maximum for one lift, and no margin for non-operational a/c is figured in. All figures are on the basis of single tow, as presently considered objective areas are out of double tow range of present bases.

3. It is thus apparent that with half of the IX TCG a/c not available, we cannot move any major U. S. unit complete in one day except on a shuttle basis, and cannot move the British 1st Div in one day either except by diversion of U. S. a/c at the expense of the American Divisions, and this combination is possible only theoretically, as the 38 Group bases, from which the British operate Stirlings and Halifaxes, are beyond the Horsa-tow range of U. S. a/c. With the shortening of the days at this time of the year and complications of turnaround, it is believed that future plans should be made on the basis of one lift per day, with all U. S. a/c available. This will permit an operation to be carried through in spite of a late start due to bad weather, whereas tight schedule plans based on two lifts per day could not be met if early morning weather were bad.

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THOMAS M. BARTLEY, JR.,
Lt Colonel, Air Corps.
G-3 Section.

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
MAIN HEADQUARTERS

GBI/OI-F/385.2-2.

4 September 1944.

SUBJECT: Defences in EASTERN HOLLAND.

TO : G-2,
First Allied Airborne Army.

(For the attention of Lt-Col., A.C. TASKER).

1. In the NIJMEGEN - ARNHEM area, the only defences known are WEST and SOUTH of NIJMEGEN.
An excellent source reported at the end of April 1944 that there were field defences along the entire length of the MAAS-WAAL Canal. These consisted of field works for machine guns and anti-tank guns at all the canal crossings. The defences are situated at road-heads on both banks of the canal. Defences are fixed at the NIJMEGEN end of the canal and two pillboxes, probably DUTCH are reported there.

Comment: This defence line is far from formidable. There is no indication that it was occupied in April or later. The positions are typical of canal and river bridge heads throughout HOLLAND.
2. In NIJMEGEN itself, a strongpoint is reported at 716627 where houses are said to have been fortified and some pillboxes built. There are also said to be tank traps (possibly an anti-tank ditch).

Comment: This position is situated SOUTH-WEST of the temporary Vehicular bridge over the WAAL: it may be for the protection of this bridge or more probably it may contain an Administrative Headquarters.
3. The former DUTCH defence line along the MAAS follows a line of the MAAS-WAAL Canal at its NORTHERN end turning EAST from NIJMEGEN along the NORTH bank of the WAAL towards DOUETINCHEM (0075). This line is thought to have consisted mainly of field works and has probably disappeared for the most part. The source who reports the field defences on the MAAS-WAAL Canal (see paragraph 1 above) states that on the WESTERN bank of the canal there were 32 DUTCH pillboxes, but that these have been filled with sand and concreted up. On the WESTERN bank opposite BROEK KANT at 677577 there is a cement factory where concrete blocks are made. It is reported that these are used for making flak emplacements. It is conceivable, therefore, that improvised concrete works may have been made since April in the NIJMEGEN area from the resources of this factory.

For the A C of S., G-2.

A.J. BEATTIE,
Major, IC,
G-2., OI.

Ext. 732.
AJB/JF

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HEADQUARTERS
FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY

APO 740, U S Army
18 September 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Operations Summary, 0800 hours 18 September.

2. Troop Carrier flash reports concerning all serials D-day have been received.

Actual total sorties	1175
Abortive 12 airplanes, 12 gliders (last gliders on take off)	
Airplanes missing	19
Gliders missing	1
Airplanes damaged beyond repair	18
Personnel casualties killed	31
wounded	7
missing	142

3. Report received at 0255 from 30 Corps forward troops at Valkensward, map reference 4108. No further advance until first light.

4. A report was received from Advanced Corps Headquarters (A/B) that bridges over Meuse at GRAVES, map reference E-6253 and at HUEKIEN, map reference E-7153, had been captured. Bridge over Maas Vall Canal south of NERBOSCH, map reference E-6760 believed blown.

5. Colonel Campbell phoned from Moor Park at 0745. No further reports received.

RALPH P. SWOFFORD, Jr.,
Colonel, Air Corps,
G-3 Section.

close at 0700 hrs
and 1900 hrs

4. All the air forces of the Royal Air Force and the American Air Forces were available for the operation. This included the Royal Air Force Bomber Command, Air Defences Great Britain, The Second Tactical Air Force, Eighth Air Force, Ninth Air Force, and the Coastal Command.

5. D day was September 17th and H hour was 1300 hours. Due to the shortening of the days, only one lift could be made and there was certain advantages resulting from an afternoon drop. This allowed early preparation by other air forces and gave the airborne troops a few hours of daylight and then the cover of darkness for their consolidation.

6. At the conference, which was held at Allied Expeditionary Air Forces Headquarters at Stanmore, the following tasks were assigned. (1600 HRS SEPT 15)

a. RAF Bomber Command: 1. On D minus one day, the Bomber Command was to attack four hostile airdromes. These airdromes were ones from which hostile craft could be brought to bear on the landing zones.

(2) Dummy drops were to be made after dark on D day west of Utrecht and east of the dropping zone area. These were to be made early on the night of D day (after dark). It was hoped by this to confuse the enemy and diversify his effort.

(3) The RAF Bomber Command was also to bomb the bridges and the surrounding flak areas on the north route on the morning of D day.

b. EIGHTH AIR FORCE

(1) Eighth Air Force was to furnish top cover along

the entire southern route.

(2) To beat down the flak and other ground fire from the I.P. on the northern route into the landing zones and dropping zones of the British Division and the 82nd Division. (See Chart).

(3) To provide high cover for dropping zones and landing zones areas during the period of the drop.

(4) To attack a large number of flak positions and strong points in the vicinity of all three division areas on the morning of D day.

(5) To attack all flak positions firing in the vicinity of the DZs and LZs during the drop, paying particular attention to those batteries that were firing.

c. Ninth Air Force:

(1) The Ninth Air Force with four groups of P-^{47s}~~38s~~ was to concentrate on flak and ground fire along the final portion of the southern route (see chart) from Delos, Center IP at 51° 6' 50" N, 04° 58' 37" E to the landing zones and dropping zones of the 101st American Airborne Division. Here their task was much the same as that laid down for the Eighth Air Force mentioned above.

d. Air Defenses Great Britain:

(1) The Air Defenses Great Britain was to furnish high cover along the northern route from the coast of England to the IP at Ellis Center. This Ellis Center is the IP of the northern route. It is at 51° 38' 15" N, 05° 18' 15" E.

Air Defenses Great Britain was also to beat down all flak

from the Dutch Islands inclusive, along this route, (see chart)

Free lance night fighter patrols were to be to the IP at Ellis Center. furnished over the areas by ADGB during the hours of darkness.

e. II Tactical Air Force

(1) The II Tactical Air Force, based as far north as Brussels, was to cooperate with the ground forces and ^{respond to} ~~necessary~~ call missions. They were not to enter the area until after the drop had been completed. This to avoid confusion within the area resulting from various forces and different types of aircraft.

(2) A small fighter cover was to be furnished over the DZs and LZs by the II Tactical Air Force during the hours of daylight after the drop and on D plus one.

f. Coastal Command

(1) The Coastal Command was prior to H hour to fly a force to the north from the Dutch Islands. It was hoped that this would engage the attention of hostile radar and might draw off some hostile air force.

7. On D plus one, H hour for the second lift was 1000 hours. The same general arrangements for duties for the various air forces held. It was agreed that this was subject to modification, inasmuch as the rapid advance of the Second Army would likely overrun the Eindhoven area, the area of the 101st Airborne Division.

8. D plus two operations were similar to those of D plus one, subject to the same alterations because of the developing situation.

9. On D plus one the Eighth Air Force was to furnish approximately 270 four engine bombers (b-24s) for resupply by parachute drop. Approximately one half of this lift was to be delivered to

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the 82nd Division in the Nijmegen area, and one half to the
101st Division in the Eindhoven area.

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Classification cancelled (Changed to

~~Secret~~) by Authority of ~~SECRET~~

1330 ~~FAA~~ by:

[Signature] ADJ Gen.

HEADQUARTERS 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION

Office of the Division Commander

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.Auth: CG 101 AB Div

.Init: *RAM*

.Date: 14 September 1944

Reg No. 1-13-9

APO 472, U. S. Army

14 September 1944

SUBJECT: Employment of 101st Airborne Division, Operation "MARKET"

TO : Army Commander, 2nd British Army

1. The following represents the plan for the employment of 101st Airborne Division, Operation "MARKET" as understood by the Division Commander.

a. Mission

The 101st Airborne Division will secure the canal and stream crossings at BIELOHOVEN, ZON, and VECHEL and thus facilitate the advance of the XXX Corps upon NIJMEGEN-ARnhem (See Annex No. 1 for possible variant). Upon being passed through by the British troops the Division will assemble and await orders. There is no present intention for its continued tactical employment in the zone of the 2nd British Army.

b. Supply

The 2nd British Army undertakes to deliver the daily supply requirements of 101st Airborne Division to supply points within the Division area. These points will be selected in advance by the appropriate administrative staff officers.

c. Artillery Fire

The support of XXX Corps artillery will be available to the Division on call through U. S. artillery liaison officers attached to XXX Corps. British artillery will not fire in the area of 101st Airborne Division except upon call from the Division. The delimiting lines will be determined in conference with XXX Corps.

d. Mutual Recognition

All British units will be notified in advance of the presence of U. S. troops in their zone of advance. It will be called to their attention that the Americans wear a new type of dark green uniform with a small American flag worn on the right sleeve. Orange or yellow smoke and flags indicate friendly troops.

e. Evacuation of Casualties

The 2nd British Army will evacuate U. S. casualties throughout the period that the 101st Airborne Division remains in the Army area.

2. Confirmation that the above understanding coincides with the wishes of the Army Commander is requested.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR,
Major General, USA,
Commanding

1 Annex:

Annex No. 1 - EINDHOVEN mission

5 Copies:

- Copy No. 1 - Army Commander, 2nd British Army
- Copy No. 2 - Army Commander, 2nd British Army
- Copy No. 3 - CG Airtroops (British)
- Copy No. 4 - First Allied Airborne Army
- Copy No. 5 - File

Copy No. 4

HEADQUARTERS 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
Office of the Division Commander

APO 472, U. S. Army
14 September 1944

SUBJECT: KINHOVEN Mission of 101st Airborne Division

TO : Army Commander, 2nd British Army

1. The agreed mission of 101st Airborne Division in operation "MARKET" includes the securing of the canal and stream crossings at KINHOVEN. Since this mission was received, Major General S. L. Williams, Commanding General of Troop Carrier Command, has determined that it is not possible to drop parachute troops south of WILHELMINA CANAL because of the flak about KINHOVEN. Consequently, the nearest drop zone for the KINHOVEN mission will be about eight miles from the objective. Allowing two hours to assemble the regiment and three hours for the approach march it is estimated that five hours will elapse before Airborne troops can reach KINHOVEN. The present tentative drop schedule places the troops on the ground about 1500 on D Day. Hence Airborne troops will not be able to reach the bridges at KINHOVEN until about 2000.

2. This time schedule indicates that Airborne troops are not likely to arrive ahead of the III Corps in time to accomplish the desired mission. The alternatives would appear to be:

a. Hold Airborne troops north of the WILHELMINA CANAL while adding to their responsibilities the control of ST OEDENRODE and the east-west lateral road to BEST.

b. In spite of time factors, march on KINHOVEN until contact is made with the enemy or friendly troops.

3. The wishes of the Army Commander are requested.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR,
Major General, USA,
Commanding

Classification cancelled (Changed to ~~Secret~~) by authority of CG

Auth: CG 101 AB Div
Init: R D M
Date: 14 September 1944

by: *[Signature]*
ADJ Gen.

Reg No. 2-14-9

HEADQUARTERS 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
Office of the Division Commander

APO 472, U. S. Army
14 September 1944

FIELD ORDER)
NUMBER 1)

1. a. Intelligence: See Annex No. 1

b. (1) First Airborne Division (British) will seize and control bridges across NEDER RIJN at ARNHEM.

(2) 82nd Airborne Division will seize and control bridges across MAAS and De WAAL Rivers near NIJMEGEN.

2. a. 101st Airborne Division will land by parachute and glider in daylight on D, D + 1 and D + 2 Days, in the ZON (444254) - VECHTEL (482375) area with the mission of seizing and holding the principal stream and canal crossings at EINDHOVEN (430180), ZON (444254) and VECHTEL (482375) in order to assist the advance of the British 2nd Army northward along the EINDHOVEN - GRAVE (620530) highway. (See Annex No. 3)

b. Composition of Airborne lifts:

D Day	432 Parachute A/C 70 CG4A Gliders
D + 1 Day	450 CG4A Gliders
D + 2 Day	382 CG4A Gliders

c. For Drop Zones and Landing Zone, see Annex No. 2. For air movement plan, see Annex No. 5.

3. a. D Day lift:

(1) 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment with two platoons Company "C", 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion attached, will land on DZ "A" and secure the canal and stream crossings in the VECHTEL (482375) area. (See Annex No. 3)

(2) 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment with one platoon Company "C", 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion and detachment Division Reconnaissance Platoon attached will land on DZ "B". It will secure the three crossings of the WILHELMINA CANAL at ZON (443253) immediately upon landing. It will be prepared to move on EINDHOVEN (430180) within two hours after landing for the purpose of securing the stream and canal crossings at that point. (See Annex No. 3)

(3) 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment with Company "C", 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion (less three platoons) attached, will land on DZ "C" and assemble in Division reserve. It will block the ZON (443253) - ST OEDENRODE (412318) road in vicinity of VILLEN BRAKEN (442295) and maintain contact with the 501st and 506th Parachute Infantry Regiments. It will send a detachment to secure the crossings (380244)(390250) of the WILHELMINA CANAL south and southeast of BEST (374266). It will be prepared to take over the bridgehead at ZON (443253) established by 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment and support the latter in its movement on EINDHOVEN (430180).

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(4) The glider element of D - Day lift will land on LZ "V" and move to area as shown in Annex No. 2a (Glider Assembly Plan). The Division Reconnaissance Platoon, less detachment, will be prepared to push reconnaissance toward SCHLUNDEL (406382) - BEST (374266) and LIESHOUT (514270).

b. D / 1 and D / 2 day lifts: Units of these lifts will land on glider landing zone "V" as shown in Annex No. 2. They will assemble as shown on Annex No. 2a and await orders.

x. (1) The bridges in the VECHEL (481376) and ZON (443253) areas will be seized with maximum speed immediately upon landing by the responsible parachute regiment. The most conveniently placed small group will rush these bridges without waiting for the assembly of large elements.

(2) All bridges and signal communications in the area will be preserved for the use of our own troops.

(3) The Division Artillery Commander is responsible for calls for support from British artillery and combat aviation.

(4) The 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment is charged with securing LZ "V" for the D Day glider lift.

(5) Colonel Thomas Sherburne, Division Artillery, is charged with the reception of glider elements upon landing zone "V".

(6) All locks and water ways in the area will be maintained in working order.

(7) All ferries, barges, etc., not actually in use by the Division will be brought to the south bank of streams to make them available for XXX Corps if required.

(8) Roads will be kept free of troops and vehicles of the Division after ground contact is made to permit the rapid transit of XXX Corps.

(9) Employment of glider pilots will be the same as for operation "LINNET".

(10) Mines will be layed only under Engineer supervision and will be carefully recorded. Our own and enemy mine fields will be reported at once to Division.

4. a. Administrative order same as for "LINNET".

b. Gas masks will be carried.

5. a. Signal Annex (Annex No. 4)

b. Tentative Command Posts

Unit

Coordinates

Corps

82nd Airborne Division

Division and Division Artillery

(442269)

501st Parachute Infantry Regiment

(477375)

502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment

(440281)

506th Parachute Infantry Regiment

(443257)

327th Glider Infantry Regiment

(435269)

c. Orange or yellow flags, panels, or smokes will be used to identify friendly troops.

For the Commanding General:

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R. D. Miller

R. D. MILLER,
Lieutenant Colonel, GSC,
Chief of Staff